If ever there was proof of the delusion of Meryl Dorey, it appears in the appeal against not only the March 31 decision to strike out the case on the basis of a lack of standing but also the costs order of June 20.
It presumes an authority that it does not have.
The appeal details – provided on Twitter by Vaxatious Litigant (who presumably got it on an application for it on file in the Federal Court – assuming it’s the document I think it is) are here;
It consists of 21 paragraphs – 20 of which I will quote and dissect here – plus a set or orders sought;
- The primary judge erred at reasons [18], [19], [20], [31] and [89] in applying section 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to the Affidavits of Meryl Dorey affirmed on 29 January 2022 and February 28 2022 in that the statutory test that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party or be misleading or confusing was not applied or was wrongly applied.
Section 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 deals with the general discretion to limit use of evidence in the terms described. The sections referred to in the reasons were perfect for this purpose. Paragraph 18 clearly showed that in the case of Dorey, she was expressing an opinion – generally not permitted. The discretion applied for in this appeal can not hold up because of the lack of evidence to back up the opinions expressed. Paragraph 19 backed that up as does paragraph 20. There was no proof for example that their approaches to Parliament in 1997 had any influence on the legislation. None. It was all hearsay. The same applies to paragraph 31 – and is a perfect example of Dorey’s delusion. The AVrN is NOT the peak vaccine organisation in Australia and is not a leader in it. Anti vaccine groups like this never are and never will be. This is backed up by the primary judge in paragraph 89.
- The primary judge erred at reasons [89] in that the appellant was denied procedural fairness or natural justice in that the Court failed to accept the unchallenged evidence of Meryl Dorey yet it criticised her or the appellant for not putting on more or further and expert evidence and holding that the evidence did not rise above the status of a bare assertion of her belief. The primary judge failed to first put this to Meryl Dorey before making this finding.
The primary judge didn’t need to. The respondent gave plenty of evidence to show how what was there failed – and that was the challenge this paragraph fails to acknowledge. Standing was challenged – and that includes a challenge to Dorey’s Affidavit in terms of accuracy. The demand for more evidence in submission was correct and it didn’t come.
- The primary judge erred by failing to identify the content of the standing test as described in Bridgetown/Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Incorporated v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (1997) (1997) 18 WAR 126 and Alliance to Save Hinchinbrook Inc. v Cook [2007] 1 Qd R 102 despite the reliance by the appellant on that content in the appellant’s submissions.
Clearly, as indicated in paragraph 109 of the decision, the lawyer who wrote this doesn’t know what he’s doing. The references to the first decision are clear as glass. The second decision was never mentioned even in the list of decisions relied upon by both parties unless I missed it somehow.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [87] in failing to find that the appellant established a special interest over and above that held by an ordinary member of the public.
This heavily relies on the objection to what was said already about paragraph 89 which has already been addressed.
- The primary judge erred at reasons in [89] in failing to afford the proper and lawful degree of weight to Ms Dorey’s opinion that the appellant was the peak vaccines organisation in Australia.
As already said – the appellant failed to prove it.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [90] in wrongly finding that the appellant was merely “voicing a concern” and that the furtherance of its objectives was not an element of the standing test.
This is another misread by the lawyer who prepared this document. The paragraph actually criticises the AVrN’s lack of a cause of action that is more applicable to an individual – hence the reference to “voicing a concern” in reality. In other words – in order to have a case (having standing or not) you have to prove vaccine injury from any of the COVID-19 vaccines personally or within the immediate family. The AVrN’s objectives for the record are falsified.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [91] in wrongly finding that the objects of the appellant were not concerned with enforcing the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) (TG Act).
This is another fail by the lawyer who created this document. The judge was right – the objectives were concerned with the actions of the states in the administration of vaccines which has nothing to do with the TG Act. In other words – where in the objectives of the AVrN are the concerns for the registration of vaccines as an example?
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [93] in wrongly finding that the objects of the appellant were not truly aligned with the objects of the TG Act.
See what I just said.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [92] in wrongly finding that the appellant was merely seeking to exercise free speech and seeking to influence public opinion and government views in pursuit of its objects and that this was not a factor in its favour in the standing test.
As the paragraph referred to says, there is no restraint on free speech or seeking influence. The objects as they stand – as I said – are best pursued through the states.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [94] in wrongly finding that the fact that the appellant had lobbied governments and made submissions to State and Commonwealth parliamentary committees and other government bodies on vaccine safety and efficacy, including with respect to the Three Vaccines and vaccination of children, and that it made available information to the public concerning vaccines, did not without more strengthen its claim to standing.
This goes back to what I said in reply to paragraph 2 of the appeal. Not enough proof of standing – or no proof as the case may be.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [95] in wrongly finding that the appellant was required to adduce expert evidence in order to establish that Ms Dorey and the other members of the appellant and their children suffered psychological or emotional harm or injury from vaccines.
This again goes back to the lack of evidence – and also draws unintentionally on the position I have always held about proof. See the blog entry “Once and for all prove it”. It also goes to my current belief that they are with holding information which should be a criminal offense.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [96] in wrongly finding that there were no indicia of standing in respect of third parties such as the appellant in the scheme established by the TG Act.
So where is the section of the TG Act that proves this? This is an empty argument and more proof of the failure of the lawyer who prepared this.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [98] in wrongly finding that the appellant was unable to demonstrate an interest greater than that of an ordinary member of the public.
The fact that the Attorney General didn’t intervene here shows that the submission by the appellant lacked a factor of interest to the AG and therefore to the public at large – in the process defeating the whole argument put here and making the paragraph referred to correct on the part of the primary judge.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [99] in wrongly finding that the appellant was merely seeking to right a wrong.
On the contrary this finding was spot on. They were seeking to right a perceived wrong.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [99] in wrongly finding that the appellant’s grievance with the impugned decisions the subject matter of the Mandamus Case did not extend beyond that of an ordinary member of the public.
This goes back again to the lack of proof as already mentioned.
- The primary judge erred at reasons [111] in wrongly finding that the appellant was not aggrieved for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review} Act 1977 (Cth) because it could not establish a grievance which would be suffered beyond that of an ordinary member of the public.
I remember the argument put in the hearing – that the AVrN would not be disadvantaged in its objectives if the case went against them. It could carry on regardless. This would be the reason behind this observation by the primary judge and is correct.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [129] in wrongly finding that the joinder applicant, Mr Neugebauer, needed to challenge the South Australian Direction and that Mr Neugebauer’s interest would not in truth be affected by the grant to the relief sought.
The primary judge was right. As observed already, the decision of the TGA has no effect on the states when it comes to all factors of the administration of the vaccine. Therefore the challenge must indeed be to the South Australian government.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [141] in wrongly finding that the relationship between Mr Neugebauer and his foster child did not give rise to a sufficient interest in Mr Neugebauer with respect to the judicial review case.
Another fail by the lawyer preparing this document – this is covered in the next paragraph (142) where mention is made of the authority held over the foster child by the Chief Executive of the DCP (Department of Child Protection) as the child is presently a ward of the state. That’s how it works.
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [143] in wrongly finding that the decision to vaccinate Mr Neugebauer’s foster child did not relate to any decision under the TG Act.
Of course it didn’t! What a ridiculous assertion! Who made the decision to mandate the vaccines? Not the TGA. It was in this case the South Australian government!
- The primary judge erred at reasons at [144] wrongly found that there was insuffcient interest for Mr Neugebauer to seek to quash the Children Decision or any s 22D Determination.
This merely follows up what I already said.
Paragraph 21 of the appeal concerns the costs decision and gives no references – preferring only to object in general. So I can’t comment on it.
The rest of the document with regard to the orders sought are predictable and will fail. The Australian Vaccination-risks Network prove yet again that they think they know better than anyone else and they don’t. Their standing in vaccines in Australia is nothing in effect – whether they like it or not. Their insistence in with holding information backs that up. They think they are invincible. They are deluded.